The rapid and increasing outsourcing of security services by states to Private Security Companies (PSCs) in recent years and associated human rights violations have served as one of the catalysts for long overdue regulation of the global PSC industry. As part of an 'empirical stocktaking', this article focuses on current multistakeholder self-regulatory developments in relation to PSCs, in particular the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers and the PSC1 certification standard, and considers their likely impact on the responsibility of states in this area. What is clear is that the traditional conception of international responsibility is ineffectual when applied to PSCs because of its focus on the ex post facto responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. Furthermore, the fact that PSCs operate in high risk and complex environments and the fact that their clients are often non-state actors, means that an alternative prophylactic approach to responsibility for human rights violations by PSCs seems to be necessary. As it stands, however, the 'self-regulationplus' approach adopted is not the definitive solution. It lets states off the hook in terms of ensuring that PSCs abide by their human rights obligations, but in doing so this allows states to evade their own obligations to protect human rights.
Introduction
The unlawful activities of certain Private Security Companies (PSCs) have been the focus of international scrutiny since the 1990s. 1 More recently, however, the international * Dr Sorcha MacLeod, University of Sheffield, School of Law. Email: s.macleod@sheffield.ac.uk. I would like to thank the editors for inviting me to present a version of this article at a SHARES seminar on 'Shared Responsibility and Organised Non-State Actors' at Utrecht University on 13 December 2013. I would also like to thank them for their valuable comments during the seminar and subsequently. Thanks are also due to Nicola Jägers and Iain Scobbie for their helpful comments on the draft. This article examines and assesses the novel international multistakeholder self-regulatory mechanisms that have emerged in response to the harmful human rights outcomes resulting from the conduct of some PSCs and considers their likely impact on the responsibility of states in this area.
2 It departs substantially in its understanding of shared responsibility as outlined in the conceptual framework of the SHARES project. 3 While the SHARES project conceives of shared responsibility as the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts that is shared by multiple actors, in this instance PSCs and a state, this article highlights that developments in this area have taken a different approach. PSCs operate in a complex and multilayered commercial environment and, as will be seen, their activities often involve no direct interactions with states. The emerging regulatory framework seeks to delineate clearly the extent of PSC obligations in relation to human rights and their ultimate responsibility, rather than mere accountability, for breaches of human rights. The Introduction to this symposium recognises that the traditional rules on state responsibility probably cannot be applied to PSCs and acknowledges that 'strengthening standards and commitments by both non-state actors and states, coupled with supervisory mechanisms' 4 is a promising alternative.
In the aftermath of the United States (US)-led coalition interventions in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, hundreds of new PSCs were set up or their existing activities expanded to take advantage of the emerging and extremely lucrative commercial opportunities in security and Law (ACIL) of the University of Amsterdam, the Utrecht Centre for Accountability and Liability Law, and the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. All websites were last accessed on 15 February 2015.
1 See e.g. 'Sandline' which was the subject of UN Doc. S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997) on the illegal export of arms to Sierra Leone. For background on the Sandline affair see UK Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Second Report, Sierra Leone, 9 February 1999 , HC 116-I, session 1998 -1999 . See also the offensive operations carried out by Sandline International in Sierra Leone and Papau New Guinea in e.g. Vierucci 2011, p. 235 and p. 237; and Wulf 2005, pp. 51-53 . See also the mercenary activities of 'Executive Outcomes', another company with UK links, which was active in Angola and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, e.g. Ballesteros EB, 'Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination', UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1997 4/ /24 (20 February 1997 , in particular para. 15. For the mercenary activities of Executive Outcomes' personnel in various African states, see e.g. Wulf 2005, p. 39, p. 43 and p. 51; and Singer 2011, pp. 101-118. 2 Different acronyms are used in the various international standards to refer to the companies discussed in this article e.g. Private Security Companies (PSCs), Private Military Companies (PMCs), Private Security Providers (PSPs) and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). The international standards referred to throughout include companies within their scope on the basis of the service they provide or function they perform. In the absence of an agreed definition, this article utilises the acronym appropriate to the relevant standard and PSC in all other cases. 3 Nollkaemper and Jacobs 2013. 4 D'Aspremont et al. 2015, section 5.3. reconstruction activities for donor governments. 5 The mounting reliance on PSCs by states is a direct result of donor state reductions in 'the size of their armed forces' to focus on 'the "core" task of combat fighting'. 6 In privatising these activities and delegating functions to proliferated throughout the past decade or so and have attracted much international attention, these abuses have not resulted in legal accountability or responsibility under international law. 33 There are two key reasons for this in international law, a third reason which relates to the nature of PSC clients, and a fourth reason relating to the lack of national legislation.
Firstly, for the purposes of attribution of conduct under international law, PSCs do not meet the strict criteria for attribution for they do not exercise governmental authority, nor does the contractual relationship with governments sufficiently infer that they are acting under the direction and control of a state. 34 Secondly, PSCs do not possess the requisite legal personality necessary for the application of international legal responsibility. The prevailing paradigm within which international law operates, has traditionally adhered to a subjectobject dichotomy in relation to international legal personality. 35 Accordingly, this means that states are subjects of international law because only they, on this analysis, exercise sovereign power and business actors are merely objects of international law for the purposes of applying and enforcing international human rights law. 36 Higgins rightly describes this situation as 'an intellectual prison of our own choosing' that is then 'declared … to be an unalterable constraint', while Pellet criticises the 'clearly "ideological" reasons' which are operating to 'avoid facing the consequences of questioning the monopoly of States over international law'. 37 Nonetheless, the effect of this position is that PSCs may not be properly regarded as current subjects of international law and, as such, are not bound by international human rights law. Higgins 1995 p. 49; Pellet 2008, p. 38, para. 8. It is this international legal lacuna that has led to the turn to standard-setting for PSCs as one alternative to the application of state responsibility principles. To that end, the international community is developing and adopting self-regulation-plus in the form of multistakeholder soft law mechanisms which incorporate government, civil society and industry oversight, as well as certification and monitoring processes which are intended to address, among other things, the harmful human rights outcomes of some PSC's activities.
A third problem is that international human rights law was never intended to apply horizontally. As Shelton remarks, human rights law was 'designed to restrain abuses by Proponents of these initiatives highlight their multistakeholder approach and attempts to ensure oversight and monitoring and argue that this renders these initiatives a more 'robust' form of self-regulation, in other words an approach which attempts to be more effective in ensuring accountability than traditional forms of self-regulation, i.e. it is self-regulationplus. 54 Most notably this is to be achieved through the use of certification procedures or auditing and this is examined in more detail below.
Both the Montreux Document and the ICoC are products of so-called multistakeholder processes which involve the participation of states, the PSC industry, as well as civil society actors, and which demonstrate an emerging shift from traditional forms of international lawmaking towards something akin to 'top-down-bottom-up' regulation. So rather than international law always being imposed on non-state actors by states from above, top-down- process. 64 Traditionally, effective self-regulation depends upon the degree of ʻexternal control and supervision' exercised by government. 65 Thus the issue of governmental ʻoversightʼ and its definition becomes of crucial importance in this instance, as can be seen below.
As of August 2014, there are 708 signatory companies to the ICoC from 70 countries.
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Presently there are 135 PSC members of ICoCA, 13 civil society organisations (CSOs) and 6
states. 67 Each of these three 'pillars' is now represented within the ICoCA, which is tasked with ensuring compliance with the ICoC. 68 Article 11.1 of the ICoCA Articles of Association provides that:
The Association shall be responsible for certifying under the Code that a company's systems and policies meet the Code's principles and the standards derived from the Code and that a company is undergoing monitoring, auditing, and verification, including in the field.
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No specific certification standard is specified in the Articles of Association and the ICoCA 'shall define the certification requirements' on the basis of 'national or international standards and processes' which comply with the International Code of Conduct. 70 Allied to company certification is internal and external oversight as well as a mechanism for addressing Code violations:
The Association shall be responsible for exercising oversight of Member companies' performance under the Code, including through external monitoring, reporting and a process to address alleged violations of the code. 71 At present it is unclear what form the oversight, monitoring, reporting and grievance arrangements will take, but the ICoCA Articles of Association make clear that it is the organisation that will exercise oversight not the member states. This again raises the question of whether states will be able to claim to be fully meeting their international legal obligations through this mechanism. Their active and dynamic participation will be essential, otherwise states will be vulnerable to claims that they have failed to meet their obligations in relation to their responsibility to protect human rights. Work is ongoing to determine the nature and substance of these processes, so it is too soon to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of the IcoCA, but its multistakeholder three-pillar approach has much to commend it. The credibility of the ICoCA will depend greatly on the robustness of the Board of Directors. It will also depend on the merits of the mechanism chosen to deal with alleged violations of the ICoC and how the Board tackles individual cases. In particular, the Board is obliged to ensure that 'effective remedies' are provided by certified PSCs, but how this is to be achieved remains to be seen. At the July 2014 meeting of the UN inter-governmental working group on PMSCs many states voiced concern about the effectiveness of the ICoC approach and ICoCA oversight, but it is simply too early to draw conclusions about their efficacy at this stage.
Towards norm internalisation?
So what do these developments mean for state responsibility for human rights violations in Given the way in which the self-regulation-plus regime has developed in relation to PSCs, it is difficult to see how the state's prerogative to regulate business actors is being challenged. Furthermore, the regulatory mechanisms are clear that state obligations and responsibility remain unaffected. It is possible, however, that the way in which the third party audit and certification process operates could, through the push towards internalisation of human rights norms in particular, result in a situation where more responsibility is being placed on PSCs for human rights violations and states are, if not quite shedding elements of responsibility, at least distancing themselves from sharing responsibility. This is related directly to the construction of the regulatory arrangements.
The PSC regulatory regime developed is complex and involves many different layers of actors beyond states, civil society and industry. PSCs will be required to demonstrate to auditors that they are complying with the human rights set out in the ICoC, that they are conducting Human Rights Risk Assessments and Analysis, and that they have instituted third party grievance mechanisms. States are removed from the various processes. As highlighted above, the ICoCA retains responsibility for oversight, monitoring and remedies, but at the level below, national accreditation bodies are required to certify certification bodies which in turn carry out the audits of PSCs. It is this complexity which could lead to states not meeting their international legal responsibilities. In this system, participant states must provide effective oversight of the ICoC itself, as well as their own national accreditation and certification bodies, because a failure to do so will result in this fragile regulatory house of cards falling apart. It is not enough that states become members of the ICoCA, as the success and credibility of the regulatory regime is dependent upon states upholding consistently the effectiveness of the international and national elements of the certification process. It is only by doing this that states can truly claim to be meeting their international human rights obligations. To acquire an understanding of the extent to which states may be distancing themselves from their responsibility to protect human rights, it is necessary to examine the mechanisms established. So what does the certification process look like and how should it work?
PSC1 and the shift towards norm internalisation
As outlined previously, the ICoC sets out a requirement for signatory companies to undertake certification or an audit to measure the extent of its compliance with the Code. 77 To that end, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and ASIS International developed a quality management system standard that includes specific requirements for audited PSCs to demonstrate that they have considered human rights risks and adverse human rights impacts as part of their management system, as well as providing remedy mechanisms for third parties affected by harmful outcomes of PSC activities. 78 PSC1, as it is known, has been endorsed and adopted by the UK government as the 'applicable standard for UK-based PSCs working in complex environments on land overseas', and since May 2012 all contracts undertaken by the US Department of Defence require conformity to the standard. 79 The PSC1 standard has been piloted in the UK. 80 It also forms the basis of a proposed international standard at the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 72WS, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121217/wmstext/121217m0001.htm. While it was stated that the government would issue a 'publication specifying that ASIS PSC 1-2012 is the applicable standard for UK-based PSCs working in complex environments on land overseas' no such document has been issued. UK National Action Plan, under 'New Actions Planned,' the UK will (ii) '[b] egin certifying Private Security Companies in the UK based on the agreed UK standard for land-based companies, by working with the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) to take forward the certification process, ensuring this includes expert human rights advice.' US Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 'Private Security Companies (PSCs)'. 80 The author acted as a Human Rights Subject-Matter Expert for an independent Certification Bodies which participated in the PSC1 pilot scheme and which was supported by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS). 81 ISO PC/284 Management system for private security operations -Requirements with guidance, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=4857900. The author is a member of British Standards Institute Mirror Committee to ISO PC/284 and a member of the UK delegation to the ISO committee. As of August 2014, the standard is at the third draft stage and it is anticipated that it will become a full ISO standard in 2015. 82 US Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations -Requirements with Guidance (PSC1). company pays for the audit. A PSC1 audit is not specifically focused on human rights, its remit is much broader, but human rights language runs throughout the entire standard and the improved protection of human rights was very much a driving force behind the creation of the standard. In addition to the ICoC, it is clear that PSC1 draws heavily upon the Protect, Respect, Remedy approach of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, especially in relation to its due diligence and grievance procedure requirements.
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In particular, PSCs are required to demonstrate that they have taken into account any potential adverse human rights impacts on external stakeholders. It is therefore necessary for a PSC to identify any external stakeholders likely to be affected by its activities, e.g. local communities. Moreover, while PSC1 does not specifically require that PSCs undertake a Human Rights Risk and Impact Analysis (HRRIA), it is clear that some form of human rights risk assessment is expected. The informative Commentary annexed to PSC1 does make a specific reference to HRRIAs but the standard itself does not use that language. This is something which companies have identified as confusing, and consequently they are unclear about their specific obligations in regard to HRRIAs.
PSC1 also includes an upstream and downstream due diligence requirement so that companies must carry out due diligence in relation to both their clients and their contractors and supply chains. This approach is in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. It seems likely that due diligence in relation to contractors and the supply chain will be easier to undertake than in relation to clients. There appears to be some reluctance on the part of PSCs to demand human rights due diligence of their clients, probably as a result of a highly competitive market. It is perceived by some PSCs that this could exclude them from certain contracts, but of course if the clients are educated and aware of their 'baseline' responsibility to respect human rights, then in theory this should become less problematic particularly as the Guiding Principles undergo wider dissemination and implementation.
PSC1 also requires conforming companies to have in place incident monitoring and reporting mechanisms. In addition, there must be accessible grievance and whistle-blower policies, and procedures which must be communicated to both internal and external stakeholders. Where a complaint is made, the PSC must document the corrective actions taken and any 83 Guiding Principles. improvement of the company's procedures and processes is a crucial aspect of the PSC1 standard.
UK PSC1 Pilot Scheme
A pilot scheme commenced in August 2013 in the UK to 'road-test' PSC1 as part of the UK government's self-described commitment to industry self-regulation. The UK has been actively involved in the drafting of the ICoC and development of the ICoCA and its participation follows many years of regulatory inaction in this area. 85 In doing so, the UK government considers itself to be meeting its obligations to ensure human rights protection through its support for 'robust regulation'. 86 Specifically, it regards its adoption of the PSC1 certification standard 87 with eventual ICoCA oversight as helping the UK to fulfil its 'commitments' under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as set out in the UK National Action Plan. 88 The pilot scheme was supported and closely followed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In addition, the UK Accreditation Service, which was to certify approved Certification Bodies to carry out PSC1 audits, was actively involved in monitoring the auditing process both in the UK and at audited project sites.
The scope of PSC1 is broad and applies to PSCs offering services and operating in complex environments. It therefore extends beyond conflict zones. As mentioned previously, there is no specific guidance on how a PSC should consider and address 'adverse human rights impacts' within its operations, e.g. through the use of HRRIAs. Nevertheless, there appears to be no hierarchy of risks and it seems to be the case that human rights risks are to be regarded as a risk in the same way as health and safety or environmental risks. The question is, to what extent will defining human rights as a risk and assessing potential adverse human rights impacts be an effective way to ensure compliance with human rights standards, and ultimately prevent the occurrence of human rights violations? Murphy notes that the move towards a risk-based approach is becoming increasingly common in a variety of spheres:
Rights as risk -emphasises a now dominant feature of governance: namely, the assessment and management of risk. Today, governments and organisations alike are expected to identify and handle the risks (financial, legal, political, reputational and so on) to which they are exposed.
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By requiring PSCs seeking certification to assess human rights as a potential risk and to implement an HRIA, PSC1 has the capacity to help 'internalise' human rights norms within a company's culture and to raise awareness of human rights impacts.
Reputational damage is of particular concern to those in the PSC sector. They have become susceptible to 'brand tarnishing' and 'reputational disaster' in the same way that the natural resource sector did in the 1990s. 90 The market for security services is extremely competitive and the highly publicised actions of a few companies in recent years have rendered the industry very sensitive to reputational risk and the potential impact that allegations of human rights abuses might have on their ability to win future contracts. This of course does not apply to rogue PSCs which choose to remain outside regulatory frameworks and which will continue to violate international human rights standards regardless.
Conclusion
It is clear that the traditional conception of international responsibility is ineffectual when applied to PSCs because of its focus on the ex post facto responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. No state has been found responsible in international law for the unlawful activities of its PSC contractors. In light of this, and the fact that PSCs operate in high risk and complex environments and that their clients are often non-state actors, an alternative prophylactic approach to responsibility for human rights violations seems to be necessary. The emerging multilayered regulatory framework in the form of the Montreux Document, the ICoC, the ICoCA, PSC1 and the draft ISO standard represents current progress. As it stands, however, this self-regulation-plus approach is not the definitive 89 There must be discussion about the merits of the different approaches as there is some concern that the certification bodies utilising SMEs are holding PSCs to a higher human rights standards than others. It is anticipated that the UK Accreditation Service will be issuing draft guidance on the matter for consultation but there must be a wider debate on this issue.
Failing that, the lack of consistency will potentially impact on the credibility of the PSC1 certification process.
Fifth, credible strategic and operational HRRIAs must be defined in the standards and undertaken by PSCs. At present it is unclear how a PSC should assess human rights risk and impacts and which tools it should use. The extent to which there is engagement with human rights expertise by the industry is also unclear. It is important that human rights risks and adverse impacts are being identified and assessed at both the management and operational levels and that companies are not engaging in a mere tick-box exercise.
Finally, the effectiveness of the PSC1 certification standard will be dependent upon the extent to which all clients, governmental, commercial and civil society, understand the certification process. In particular, it is important that they understand the potentially limited scope of certification and the importance of auditor human rights competence.
Given these significant concerns it is crucial that states actively support the development of the emerging certification process to ensure that the system matures effectively and becomes more widely recognised and adopted. Ultimately it is in the interest of states to do so if they expect the international community to accept that their due diligence obligations under international law to protect human rights are being met. Anything else will be perceived as unsatisfactorily shifting all responsibility for human rights violations onto PSCs. 
